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Abstract
In this paper we consider symmetric bimatrix games [A,AT]. We use a matrix operator s(A), defined
as the sum of the cofactors of the given matrix A, for finding the population equilibrium and its fitness in
evolutionarily matrix games with all supported strategies, and to complete Bishop–Cannings Theorem.
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1. Preliminaries
In common opinion, for instance [1], Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) was born in 1973
when John Maynard Smith (biologist) and George R. Price (mathematician) wrote their famous
article in Nature [2] describing the idea of applying game theory to the behavior of animals. So it
was quite natural, that at first the EGT was the application of game theory in evolutionary biology
and was used to understand situations in which the payoffs of what an individual did depend
on what other individuals were doing in the population. A really large increasing of interest in
the EGT could be observed since 1994 when The Central Bank of Sweden in Economic Science
in Memory of Alfred Nobel was award to John Nash, John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten for
their contribution to game theory. Nowadays the EGT has found applications in many fields like
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economics, for example [3], psychology [4], anthropology [5], ecology [6], language theory [7],
and language learning [8], sociology [9], ethics [10], philosophy [11], and others.
It can be said that the EGT is an extension to traditional game theory as it studies games
played by individuals from a large population and the action they take is determined by natural
selection. A population is in equilibrium (PE) when there is Nash equilibrium for the frequency
of occurrence of competing behavioral strategies in the population, or in other words, when the
population achieves the balance of nature, what is the metaphor taken from population ecology
[12].
In general case if we consider a bimatrix game [A,B], where A,B ∈ Rn×n, and A is the
payoff matrix for first individual, called Row, B is the payoff matrix for second individual, named
Column, then a pair (p, q) of strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game [A,B]
if and only if
{
pTAq  xTAq for all Row’s strategies x (p is the best response to q),
pTBq  pTBy for all Column’s strategies y (q is the best response to p).
In the EGT, used to model the evolution of species, a strategy is a behavioral phenotype and it
specifies what an individual will do in any situation. The EGT restricts itself mostly to symmetric
bimatrix games [A,AT]. Therefore, in this restricted case, since q=p, y=x, B = AT, a profile p
is a population equilibrium (PE) if and only if
pTAp  xTAp for all strategies x.
In other words the PE is a set of actions p which must be the best response to all strategies.
Furthermore, the PE is the condition must be met if the proportion of individuals is to be stable.
The concept of the PE is of particular importance in evolutionary matrix games as it is applied in
considering behavior adopted by various organisms. We put standard assumptions:
• the same set of behavioral phenotypes is available to each individual, where the phenotype is
predetermined by the genotype of the species;
• considered population is a large set of individuals and the action an individual takes in the
game is determined by natural selection;
• two individuals, Row and Column, are repeatedly and randomly matched to play the game and
every time the same game is played;
• the payoff an individual receives from playing the game against other individuals provides a
fitness measure used as the basic for selection.
As it is known, in bimatrix games the individuals are not completely antagonistic to one another
(contrary to two person zero-sum games [A,−A], where one individual wins what another indi-
vidual loses); if Row playing a strategy x meets Column playing a strategy y, then Row’s fitness
is E(x, y) = xTAy and Column’s fitness is E(y, x) = yTAx.
In game theory Nash equilibrium usually is found by Lemke–Howson algorithm and its later
different modifications or by linear programming (on May 13, 2005 died George Dantzig who in
1947 made the contribution to mathematics for which he was most famous, the simplex method
of optimization. The known term linear programming was proposed by Tjalling Koopmans one
year later, and since then Dantzig was nicknamed Father of linear programming). The paper
also develops algebraic approach to game theory, and equilibrium is found by sums of cofactors.
Therefore let introduce now the sums of cofactors of the given matrix.
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Definition 1. Denoting by Ars the rs-th cofactor of A = [aij ] ∈ Rn×n we set:
sk(A) =
n∑
j=1
Akj (k = 1, 2, . . ., n), (1)
sk(A) =
n∑
i=1
Aik (k = 1, 2, . . ., n), (2)
s(A) =
n∑
k=1
sk(A) =
n∑
k=1
sk(A). (3)
It is easy to observe that
sk(A) = det A(k), sk(A) = det A(k), (4)
where A(k) (A(k), respectively) is the matrix of A with all entries of the kth row (kth column,
respectively) replaced by ones.
Lemma 1. Some properties of s(A) coincide with corresponding properties of the determinant,
however some properties of s(A) differ from those of det A, namely:
1. s(AT) = s(A).
2. s(B) = −s(A), where B is obtained from A by exchanging two rows (columns).
3. s(cA) = cn−1 · s(A), whereas det(cA) = cn · det A.
4. For a matrix A with a row (column) of zeros s(A) differs in general from zero, whereas
det A = 0.
5. s(AB) differs in general from s(A)s(B), whereas det(AB) = det A det B.
6. If B results from A by adding a multiple of one row (column) to another row (column), then
s(A) differs in general from s(B), whereas det B = det A.
Definition 2. As the game with the preference parameter λ ∈ 〈0, 1〉 we define a family of games
[Aλ,ATλ ], where
Aλ = (1 − λ)A + λAT. (5)
The matrix ATλ is called the altruistic dual matrix of Aλ. It is easy to see, that the matrix Aλ and
its altruistic dual matrix are connected as follows:
ATλ = A1−λ. (6)
Aλ reduces to the original fitness matrix A for λ = 0 (egoistic value) and to the opponent’s
fitness matrix AT for λ = 1 (altruistic value). The parameter λ can be also interpreted as a social
norm (socially imposed norm by tax enforces an individual to maximize payoff with preference
λ), an imperfect information or as an error. Note that according to Definition 2, altruism and
egoism are context dependent. It implies that one individual preferences affect both his own
behavior and the behavior of his opponent. Moreover, we can interpret the original game [A,AT]
in an unexpected way: it is the game, where an individual as an egoist plays against himself
as an altruistic alter ego. That interpretation follows immediately from (6), which implies—as
particular case—the following equalities:
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A0 = AT1 = A, A1 = AT0 = AT.
Since (5), and (6), it can be easy seen, that any symmetric matrix is the altruistic dual matrix of
itself
A = AT〈=〉Aλ = A, λ ∈ 〈0, 1〉
Altruism has obtained its mathematical expression by Bester and Güth [13]. In their paper is
also shown that altruistic behavior (preferences of an individual reflect some concern for success
of the others) can increase the fitness of a majority of individuals in an ecosystem. Formally, such
preferences are described as
Eλ(x, y) = (1 − λ)E(x, y) + λE(y, x)
or in matrix form
Eλ(x, y) = (1 − λ)xTAy + λyTAx.
2. Results
The following two lemmas show next difference between s(A) and det A. They also imply that
the proportion of types in the PE, given by formula (9), does not depend on addition any constant
matrix to the given fitness matrix and does not depend on multiplication the fitness matrix by non
zero number as well.
Lemma 2. The operator s(A) is invariant with respect to addition of constant matrices cE, where
c ∈ R and E denotes the matrix with all entries equal to one:
s(A + cE) = s(A). (7)
Proof. Consider sk(A + cE) for any fixed 1  k  n. If we subtract the kth row multiplied by
the constant c from all other rows, then the value of the operator sk will not change. Hence, the
following equality is true:
sk(A + cE) = det


a11 + c . . . a1n + c
. . . . . .
ak−1,1 + c . . . ak−1,n + c
1 . . . 1
ak+1,1 + c . . . ak+1,n + c
. . . . . .
an1 + c . . . ann + c


= det


a11 . . . a1n
. . . . . .
ak−1,1 . . . ak−1,n
1 . . . 1
ak+1,1 . . . ak+1,n
. . . . . .
an1 . . . ann


= sk(A)
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and therefore
s(A + cE) =
n∑
k=1
sk(A + cE) =
n∑
k=1
sk(A) = s(A). 
Lemma 3. For any matrix A ∈ Rn×n and c ∈ R we have:
det(A + cE) = det A + c · s(A). (8)
Proof. By properties of the determinant and (7) we obtain
det(A + cE) = det


a11 + c a12 + c · · · a1n + c
a21 + c a22 + c · · · a2n + c
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
an1 + c an2 + c · · · ann + c


= det


a11 a12 + c · · · a1n + c
a21 a22 + c · · · a2n + c
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
an1 an2 + c · · · ann + c

+ c · s1(A)
= det


a11 a12 a13 + c · · · a1n + c
a21 a22 a23 + c · · · a2n + c
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
an1 an2 an3 + c · · · ann + c

+ c · s1(A) + c · s2(A)
= · · · = det


a11 a12 · · · a1n
a21 a22 · · · a2n
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
an1 an2 · · · ann


+ c ·
n∑
k=1
sk(A) = det A + c · s(A). 
The theorem below shows that under some conditions there must exist population equilibrium
in mixed strategies, with support containing all pure strategies.
Theorem. Let [A,AT] be an evolutionary game, where A ∈ Rn×n, s(A) /= 0 and all si(A) are
negative (positive). If fi denotes the proportion of the ith type (i = 1, . . . , n) in the PE of the
given population, then:
fi : fj = si(A) : sj (A); i, j = 1, . . . , n (9)
and the fitness E(A) of the entire population per capita is given by formula:
E(A) = det A
s(A)
. (10)
Proof. When Column is playing her strategies with probabilities y1, . . . , yn, then Row’s expected
payoffs, when he plays his ith strategy (i = 1, . . ., n), are
Ei =
n∑
j=1
aij yj (i = 1, . . ., n). (11)
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If Row is indifferent among these strategies, all his expected payoffs are the same. This means
that Column must solve the following system of linear equations:
Ay = c; where c = [c, . . ., c]T(c is unknown value) (12)
We will consider two cases, because if s(A) /= 0, then it has to be rank(A) = n or rank(A) =
n − 1. Really, assume that s(A) /= 0, and at the same time rank(A) < n − 1. But in this case
all cofactors of A with respect of any row (column) are equal to zero. Since for rows we have
sk(A) = det A(k) = 0 (for columns we have sk(A) = det A(k) = 0), then from (3), (4) we get
s(A) = 0 (contradiction).
Case 1 (A is non-singular). If A is non-singular, then the system (12) has the unique solution,
where
yj = cdet As
j (A); j = 1, . . . , n.
Hence, by (3) we get
n∑
j=1
yj = 1 => cdet A
n∑
j=1
sj (A) = 1 => c s(A)
det A
= 1.
So yj = sj (A)s(A) and (9) follows, as pi : pj = yi : yj = si(A): sj (A); i, j = 1, . . . , n.
Moreover, the determinant of A can be evaluated by sj or si to obtain the following quasi-
Laplacian expansion:
n∑
j=1
akj s
j (A) =
n∑
i=1
aiksi(A) = det A. (13)
In fact, if we consider the kth (1 k  n) equation in the system Ay = c, then we have:
n∑
j=1
akj
sj (A)
s(A)
= 1
s(A)
n∑
j=1
akj s
j (A) = det A
s(A)
=>
n∑
j=1
akj s
j (A) = det A.
Similarly we get the second part of the expansion:
n∑
i=1
aik
si(A)
s(A)
= 1
s(A)
n∑
i=1
aiksi(A) = det A
s(A)
=>
n∑
i=1
aiksi(A) = det A.
Case 2 (A is singular and rank(A) = n − 1). Obviously, if rank(A) < n, then det A = 0. Without
loss of generality we can assume that in the system Ay = c at least two coefficients of the nth
equation, say an1 /= an2, have to be different. Then, by the Kronecker–Capelli theorem, the system
above is consistent if rank(A, c) = rank(A) = n − 1. This means that the system of the vectors
vi = [2ai1, . . ., 2ain, c], i = 1, . . ., n (14)
is linear dependent. Assume that
vn =
n−1∑
i=1
βivi , where
n−1∑
i=1
β2i > 0.
By comparing the last coefficients of (14), we have
n−1∑
i=1
βic = c.
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We need to show now that c must be equal to zero.
Really, if c /= 0, then∑n−1i=1 βi = 1. As rank(A) = n − 1, the subsystem of (13)

a11β1 + · · · + an−1,1βn−1 = an1
. . .
a1,n−1β1 + · · · + an−1,n−1βn−1 = an,n−1
is the Cramer’s system.
Therefore we obtain
an1 = · · · = an,n−1,
which is in contrary to the assumption an1 /= an2.
Hence c = det A = 0. So in the case under consideration the system becomes the homogeneous
system Ay = 0, i.e. the rth equation (r = 1, . . ., n) has the form:
n∑
j=1
arj yj = 0,
which, by (13), we can write as
n∑
j=1
arj s
j (A)t = 0; t ∈ R.
Hence yj = sj (A)t, j = 1, . . ., n.
Similarly as in Case 1, by (3), we get
n∑
j=1
yj =
n∑
j=1
sj (A)t = s(A)t = 1 => t = 1
s(A)
.
Therefore
yj = sj (A)t = s
j (A)
s(A)
, j = 1, . . . , n.
Similarly, when Row is playing his strategies with probabilities x1, . . . , xn then Column’s
expected payoffs, when she plays her jth strategy (j = 1, . . ., n), are equal to
Ej =
n∑
i=1
aij xi .
If Column is indifferent among these strategies, all her expected payoffs are the same. This
means that Row has to solve the following system of linear equations:
ATx = d, where d = [d, . . ., d]T.
But we have
d = det A
T
s(AT)
= det A
s(A)
= c,
and by Lemma 1
s(AT) = s(A), sk(AT) = sk(A),
so we obtain
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xi = si(A
T)
s(AT)
= s
i(A)
s(A)
; i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore fi : fj = xi : xj = si(A) : sj (A); i, j = 1, . . . , n. 
Note that if we consider the population of N individuals, then we can interpret fi either as
there is the set of fi · N individuals with the ith type, or alternatively, as the probability that an
individual will play the ith type equals fi .
Bishop and Cannings [14] showed a useful result that if p is a mixed evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS) with support p1, . . . , pn, then
E(p1, p) = E(p2, p) = · · · = E(pn, p) = E(p, p).
In other words all supported strategies must have the same fitness when played against the
ESS. Following theorem, we can complete Bishop–Cannings result as follows in the corollary
below:
Corollary 1. If in the evolutionary bi-matrix game [A,AT] a strategy p is a mixed ESS with
support p1, . . . , pn, then
E(pi, p) = det A
s(A)
; i = 1, . . . , n (15)
or, using (8), we can write
E(pi, p) = det Adet(A + E) − det A ; i = 1, . . . , n. (16)
Corollary 2. From Lemmas 2, 3, and Theorem, and Property 3 of s(A), we immediately obtain
well known properties of matrix games:
E(A + cE) = det(A + cE)
s(A + cE) =
det A + cs(A)
s(A)
= E(A) + c, (17)
E(cA) = det(cA)
s(cA)
= c
n det A
cn−1s(A)
= cdet A
s(A)
= cE(A). (18)
Corollary 3. Cheon’s Formula [15] says, that at the PE the fitness of the game with the parameter
λ and the fitness its altruistic dual game are equal:
E(A1−λ) = E(Aλ). (19)
Since (10), (5), and (6) we can give the short proof of (19):
E(A1−λ) = det A1−λ
s(A1−λ)
= det A
T
1−λ
s(AT1−λ)
= det Aλ
s(Aλ)
= E(Aλ).
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